Feng, Li
- Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
Abstract
We determine the circumstances when the absence of public listing, often believed to be a disadvantage, makes a cooperative the unique efficient governance structure. This is established in a multi-task principalagent model, capturing that cooperatives are not publicly listed and their CEOs have to bring the downstream enterprise to value as well as to serve upstream member interests. Not having a public listing prevents the CEO from choosing the level of the downstream activities too high. Cooperatives are uniquely efficient when the upstream marginal product multiplied with a function increasing in the strength of the chain complementarities is higher than the downstream marginal product.
Keywords
chains; measurement; governance; cooperatives; D21; L23; Q13
Published in
European Review of Agricultural Economics
2012, volume: 39, number: 2, pages: 241-255
Publisher: OXFORD UNIV PRESS
SLU Authors
UKÄ Subject classification
Economics
Publication identifier
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbr007
Permanent link to this page (URI)
https://res.slu.se/id/publ/39969