Hoffmann, Ruben
- Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
Abstract
In recent years, it has become common for downstream firms to impose Joint Private Standards (JPSs) on upstream producers. In this paper, we present an original model of a vertical relationship, explaining the incentives for and the effects of such JPSs with an example concerning food safety. The risk of a food crisis is endogenously determined. Using the concept of cartel stability (), it is shown that liability rules are crucial for JPSs to emerge, that a JPS can become a minimum quality standard, and that a more stringent JPS does not necessarily reduce the market risk.
Keywords
Private Standards; Safety; Vertical Relationships; Liability; Food Retailing
Published in
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
2012, volume: 21, number: 1, pages: 179-212
Publisher: WILEY-BLACKWELL
SLU Authors
Global goals (SDG)
UKÄ Subject classification
Social Sciences
Food Science
Economics and Business
Publication identifier
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00320.x
Permanent link to this page (URI)
https://res.slu.se/id/publ/56378