Bostedt, Göran
- Department of Forest Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
Abstract
This paper presents a first empirical assessment of carnivore conservation under a performance payment scheme. In Sweden, reindeer herder villages are paid based on the number of lynx (lynx lynx) and wolverine (gulo gulo) offspring certified on their pastures. The villages decide on the internal payment distribution. It is generally assumed that benefit distribution rules are exogenous. We investigate them as an endogenous decision. The data reveals that villages' group size has a direct negative effect on conservation outcomes and an indirect positive effect which impacts conservation outcomes through the benefit distribution rule. This result revises the collective action hypothesis on purely negative effects of group size.
Keywords
Performance payments; Group payments; Wildlife conservation; Empirical policy assessment; Sweden; Lynx; Wolverine
Published in
Environmental and Resource Economics
2014, volume: 59, number: 4, pages: 613-631
SLU Authors
Associated SLU-program
Sámi and reindeer husbandry related research
Global goals (SDG)
UKÄ Subject classification
Other Biological Topics
Economics
Ecology
Publication identifier
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-013-9752-x
Permanent link to this page (URI)
https://res.slu.se/id/publ/63132