Ghosh, Ranjan Kumar
- Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
Abstract
This chapter presents a discussion on the economic governance aspect of sustainability in the context of energy policy and access. It is believed that incentives are sufficient for emergence of competitive energy markets which augment energy access. However, recent developments in Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) have shown that this need not be true when costs arising out of incomplete contracting are high. Yet, the role of transaction costs and the need to identify and model their behavior has not received adequate attention. This chapter reviews the basic tenets of TCE around natural monopoly sectors. It then illustrates in greater micro-analytic detail how transaction costs can be identified and empirically modeled in the context of industrial self-generation of electricity. The conclusion is that in the analysis of production systems, sustainability arguments are not complete unless costs arising out of inefficient contracting are accounted and an adequate economic governance apparatus is set-up.
Published in
Advances in Finance, Accounting, and Economics (AFAE)
2016, number: 8, pages: 130-144
Title: Economic Modeling, Analysis, and Policy for Sustainability
Publisher: IGI Global
SLU Authors
UKÄ Subject classification
Environmental Sciences
Economics
Publication identifier
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-5225-0094-0
- ISBN: 978-1522500940
Permanent link to this page (URI)
https://res.slu.se/id/publ/76842