‘Relational Values’ is Neither a Necessary nor Justified Ethical Concept

Abstract

‘Relational value’ (RV) has intuitive credibility due to the shortcomings of existing axiological categories regarding recognizing the ethical relevance of people’s relations to nature. But RV is justified by arguments and analogies that do not hold up to closer scrutiny, which strengthens the assumption that RV is redundant. While RV may provide reasons for ethically considering some relations, much work remains to show that RV is a concept that does something existing axiological concepts cannot, beyond empirically describing relations people have to environmental areas and places.

Keywords

Relational values; instrumental values; extrinsic values; intrinsic values

Published in

Ethics, Policy & Environment
2025, volume: 28, number: 1, pages: 62-78

SLU Authors

• Baard, Patrik

  • University of Oslo (UiO)

UKÄ Subject classification

Ethics

Publication identifier

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2024.2334631

Permanent link to this page (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/133001