Abstract

It is widely assumed that neuroscience has proved that conscious will is an illusion. Indeed, a number of experimental results seem to indicate that conscious will is not causally related to the willed action, i.e. epiphenomenal. There are, however, alternative ways of interpreting the results that these conclusions are based on, and this paper examines the scientific arguments and experiments regarding conscious will. We argue that there is, as yet, no empirical support for epiphenomenal conscious will, and that the alternative hypothesis, that conscious will is causative, is also consistent with experimental data. We also use computational models and simulations to demonstrate that local neural impulses may trigger global oscillatory activity after a substantial delay period, supporting the idea that intentional impulses may be part of a conscious will experience.

Keywords

Free will; Intention; Consciousness; Neuronal causation; EEG; fMRI; Brain stimulation; Cortical networks; Computer simulations

Published in

Advances in cognitive neurodynamics
2014, Volume: 4, pages: 523-529
Book title: Advances in Cognitive Neurodynamics (IV)
ISBN: 978-94-017-9547-0, eISBN: 978-94-017-9548-7
Publisher: Springer

Conference

4th International Conference on Cognitive Neurodynamics (ICCN), JUN 23-27, 2013, Sigtuna, SWEDEN

SLU Authors

• Liljenström, Hans

  • Department of Energy and Technology, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
    
  • Agora for Biosystems

UKÄ Subject classification

Neurosciences
Other Computer and Information Science
Applied Psychology


Publication Identifiers

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9548-7_75

Permanent link to this page (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/65214