Ghosh, Ranjan Kumar
- Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
Abstract
The aim of power sector reforms in India initiated in the early 1990s was to invite private participation, normalize tariffs, remove cross-subsidies and increase efficiency. In pursuance of this a system of independent regulation was set up which was to manage the various actors through assurance and credible commitments. In essence, commitment was an important aim. The means adopted to achieve this were market oriented liberalization and partial deregulation. This thesis has re-evaluated the claim that the means meet the end adequately. A Coasean institutional methodology is adopted which relies on pragmatic selection of empirical methods and an abductive inferential program. Thus a comparative institutional analysis framework which uses quantitative as well case-study tools has been applied. Through analysis of the three key segments in the generation side - public utilities, private utilities and private non-utilities – it has been shown that there are inefficiencies and high transaction costs in the current environment. It has been further argued that when the neo-classical assumption of zero transaction costs is violated, power markets may not be an efficient or a feasible solution. Therefore, a regulatory structure which minimizes transaction costs and increases commitment has to be a priority, even if this implies moving away from the benchmark solution of a functioning competition.
Published in
Institutional Change in Agriculture and Natural Resources (ICAR)
2014, number: 51
Publisher: Shaker Verlag
SLU Authors
UKÄ Subject classification
Business Administration
Economics
Publication identifier
- ISBN: 978-3-8440-3263-5
Permanent link to this page (URI)
https://res.slu.se/id/publ/65590