Abstract

This paper discusses the application of the supreme emergency doctrine from just-war theory to non-antagonistic threats. Two versions of the doctrine are considered: Michael Walzer's communitarian version and Brian Orend's prudential one. I investigate first whether the doctrines are applicable to non-antagonistic threats, and second whether they are defensible. I argue that a version of Walzer's doctrine seems to be applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that it is very doubtful whether the doctrine is defensible. I also argue that Orend's version of the doctrine is applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that his account is not defensible, regardless of whether the threats are antagonistic or not.

Keywords

Ethics; Supreme emergency; Just war; Disease control

Published in

PHILOSOPHIA
2009, Volume: 37, number: 1, pages: 153-167

UKÄ Subject classification

Ethics


Publication identifier

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9145-5

Permanent link to this page (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/86784