Abstract

Cooperatives may become increasingly important as suppliers of electricity from renewable resources. Numerous governance models exist for establishing a renewable energy cooperative. Since members self-select into the organization, causal links between methods of internal governance and member characteristics are difficult to identify. We demonstrate how economic experiments can address this problem. In a simple social-dilemma game, we study the impact of heterogeneity in wealth on investment in a jointly owned enterprise under two different governance models. We do not find that member heterogeneity or governance model affect investment levels. A participant's endowment appears to be the most important factor explaining variation in investment. Good knowledge of cooperative governance has a positive impact on investment in the game and good knowledge of game theory has a negative impact on investment in the game. Future research should investigate the effect of the distribution of control rights on the performance of cooperative enterprises. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords

Energy transition; Germany; Land-use conflicts and governance

Published in

Utilities Policy
2015, Volume: 36, pages: 52-56

UKÄ Subject classification

Economics


Publication identifier

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2015.09.003

Permanent link to this page (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/95697