Abstract

Action-based payments that compensate farmers for adopting land-management measures to preserve and enhance the environment have been criticized for being ineffective. The root of the problem is that farmers are not paid for achieving a desired environmental benefit, but compensated for their costs of management. There is growing interest in formulating result-based economic incentives. By paying for an environmental benefit and allowing flexibility in how to achieve it, farmers are given an incentive to exploit their comparative advantages for achieving a desired environmental benefit cost-effectively. However, the feasibility and relative effectiveness of result-based payments for reducing agricultural pollution is contentious. In this study, we designed and evaluated a result-based payment scheme for nonpoint-source pollution abatement from arable land. In a case study in southern Sweden, the cost-effectiveness of the new scheme was compared with that of an existing action-based scheme for vegetated buffer strips to prevent the pollutant, particulate phosphorus, from reaching water resources. The results suggest that result-based payment schemes based on modeled outcomes of pollution abatement are feasible and will considerably improve cost-effectiveness compared to action-based schemes, by relocating buffer strips to where they are more effective and not simply where they have the lowest costs for farmers.

Keywords

Performance based policy; Nonpoint source pollution; Nutrient runoff; Buffer strip; Agri-environmental scheme; Cost-effective

Published in

Land Use Policy
2018, Volume: 77, pages: 209-219
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCI LTD

SLU Authors

• Brady, Mark

  • Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
    
  • Lund University

Sustainable Development Goals

SDG15 Life on land


UKÄ Subject classification

Environmental Sciences related to Agriculture and Land-use


Publication identifier

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.05.017

Permanent link to this page (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/96615