Sammanfattning

Much has been written about climate change from an ethical view in general, but less has been written about it from a libertarian point of view in particular. In this paper, I apply the libertarian moral theory to the problem of climate change. I focus on libertarianism's implications for our individual emissions. I argue that (i) even if our individual emissions cause no harm to others, these emissions cross other people's boundaries, (ii) although the boundary-crossings that are due to our 'subsistence emissions' are implicitly consented to by others, there is no such consent to our 'non-subsistence emissions', and (iii) there is no independent justification for these emissions. Although offsetting would provide such a justification, most emitters do not offset their non-subsistence emissions. Therefore, these emissions violate people's rights, which means that they are impermissible according to libertarianism's non-aggression principle.

Nyckelord

Libertarianism; Non-aggression principle; Boundary-crossings; Individual emissions; Offsetting; Individual climate responsibility

Publicerad i

Res Publica
2022, Volym: 28, nummer: 1, sidor: 125-148
Utgivare: SPRINGER

SLU författare

• Torpman, Olle

  • Institutionen för tillämpad husdjursvetenskap och välfärd, Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet
    
  • Institutet för framtidsstudier
  • Stockholms Universitet

UKÄ forskningsämne

Etik


Publikationens identifierare

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-021-09514-3

Permanent länk till denna sida (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/112614