Sammanfattning

We model competition between an oil monopolist and competitive suppliers of coal and renewable energy in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. We show that market power- which disrupts the order of extraction-may lead to higher long-run emissions by encouraging early extraction of dirty fuels such as coal which would otherwise remain in the ground permanently; simply banning coal burning may be better than Pigovian taxation. Market power can of course be corrected by production subsidies to the monopolist, but when distribution affects welfare a better option is to offer subsidies to renewable energy, which force the oil monopolist to reduce her (limit) price but are never actually paid out.

Nyckelord

Market power; OPEC; Coal; Climate change

Publicerad i

European Economic Review
2022, Volym: 148, artikelnummer: 104211
Utgivare: ELSEVIER

SLU författare

• Hart, Robert

  • Institutionen för ekonomi, Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet
    

Globala målen

SDG7 Säkerställa tillgång till ekonomiskt överkomlig, tillförlitlig, hållbar och modern energi för alla
SDG12 Säkerställa hållbara konsumtions- och produktionsmönster


UKÄ forskningsämne

Nationalekonomi


Publikationens identifierare

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104211

Permanent länk till denna sida (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/118731