Sammanfattning

In this paper we study the optimal conversion policy set by a society composed of a sequence of non-overlapping imperfectly altruistic generations. We show that society can be equivalently viewed as a sequence of hyperbolic discounting agents. Under uncertainty about future pay-offs we determine, as solution to an intergenerational non-cooperative dynamic game, the optimal timing of irreversible conversion. We show that under both naive and sophisticated beliefs about future time-inconsistency, the option value attached to the conversion decision is eroded and earlier conversion occurs. This determines a drastic bias toward the current generation gratification, which affects the intergenerational allocation of benefits and costs from deforestation.

Nyckelord

Real options; Intergenerational imperfect altruism; Hyperbolic discounting; Timing game.

Publicerad i

Journal of Forest Economics
2012, Volym: 18, nummer: 3, sidor: 194-206
Utgivare: Elsevier

SLU författare

• Di Corato, Luca

  • Institutionen för ekonomi, Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet
    

Globala målen

SDG15 Skydda, återställa och främja ett hållbart nyttjande av landbaserade ekosystem, hållbart bruka skogar, bekämpa ökenspridning, hejda och vrida tillbaka markförstöringen samt hejda förlusten av biologisk mångfald


UKÄ forskningsämne

Nationalekonomi


Publikationens identifierare

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfe.2012.02.002

Permanent länk till denna sida (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/39511