Sammanfattning

In recent years, it has become common for downstream firms to impose Joint Private Standards (JPSs) on upstream producers. In this paper, we present an original model of a vertical relationship, explaining the incentives for and the effects of such JPSs with an example concerning food safety. The risk of a food crisis is endogenously determined. Using the concept of cartel stability (), it is shown that liability rules are crucial for JPSs to emerge, that a JPS can become a minimum quality standard, and that a more stringent JPS does not necessarily reduce the market risk.

Nyckelord

Private Standards; Safety; Vertical Relationships; Liability; Food Retailing

Publicerad i

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
2012, Volym: 21, nummer: 1, sidor: 179-212
Utgivare: WILEY-BLACKWELL

SLU författare

• Hoffmann, Ruben

  • Institutionen för ekonomi, Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet
    

Globala målen

SDG2 Avskaffa hunger, uppnå tryggad livsmedelsförsörjning och förbättrad nutrition samt främja ett hållbart jordbruk


UKÄ forskningsämne

Samhällsvetenskap
Livsmedelsvetenskap
Ekonomi och näringsliv


Publikationens identifierare

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00320.x

Permanent länk till denna sida (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/56378