Sammanfattning

It is widely assumed that neuroscience has proved that conscious will is an illusion. Indeed, a number of experimental results seem to indicate that conscious will is not causally related to the willed action, i.e. epiphenomenal. There are, however, alternative ways of interpreting the results that these conclusions are based on, and this paper examines the scientific arguments and experiments regarding conscious will. We argue that there is, as yet, no empirical support for epiphenomenal conscious will, and that the alternative hypothesis, that conscious will is causative, is also consistent with experimental data. We also use computational models and simulations to demonstrate that local neural impulses may trigger global oscillatory activity after a substantial delay period, supporting the idea that intentional impulses may be part of a conscious will experience.

Nyckelord

Free will; Intention; Consciousness; Neuronal causation; EEG; fMRI; Brain stimulation; Cortical networks; Computer simulations

Publicerad i

Advances in cognitive neurodynamics
2014, Volym: 4, sidor: 523-529
Titel: Advances in Cognitive Neurodynamics (IV)
ISBN: 978-94-017-9547-0, eISBN: 978-94-017-9548-7
Utgivare: Springer
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-9548-7_75

Konferens

4th International Conference on Cognitive Neurodynamics (ICCN), JUN 23-27, 2013, Sigtuna, SWEDEN

SLU författare

• Liljenström, Hans

  • Institutionen för energi och teknik, Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet
    
  • Agora for Biosystems

UKÄ forskningsämne

Neurovetenskaper
Annan data- och informationsvetenskap
Tillämpad psykologi


Publikationens identifierare

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9548-7_75

Permanent länk till denna sida (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/65214