Sammanfattning

During recent decades, there have been many failures among large and complex agricultural co-operatives with a traditional organizational structure, that is, with mainly collective governance and collective ownership. Many co-operatives have been converted into the so-called hybrid co-operatives, owned together with external financiers. This article applies governance cost theory to explain this development. The results show that members are not able to govern a collectively owned firm that is large and complex; members are thus reluctant to invest in co-operatives; and members do not perceive that co-operatives benefit them economically. Thus, strong leaders take control and non-member investors gain ownership and influence.

Nyckelord

governance cost; traditional co-operative; co-operative conversion; hybrid co-operative; co-operative governance

Publicerad i

Outlook On Agriculture
2018, Volym: 47, nummer: 2, sidor: 87-92

SLU författare

• Nilsson, Jerker

  • Institutionen för ekonomi, Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet
    

UKÄ forskningsämne

Företagsekonomi


Publikationens identifierare

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0030727018761175

Permanent länk till denna sida (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/95680