Moral hazard, vertical integration, and public monitoring in credence goods

Sammanfattning

Moral hazard is a problem in markets where the qualities or characteristics of products cannot be verified with certainty by consumers. Here we demonstrate that vertical integration is one possible way of dealing with such problems. When the saving of monitoring costs is the driving force behind vertical integration, public monitoring freely available to the market may prevent vertical integration.

Nyckelord

credence goods; moral hazard; vertical integration

Publicerad i

European Review of Agricultural Economics
2002, volym: 29, nummer: 2, sidor: 271-279

SLU författare

• Karantininis, Konstantinos

  • Institutionen för ekonomi, Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet
    

UKÄ forskningsämne

Nationalekonomi

Publikationens identifierare

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/eurrag/29.2.271

Permanent länk till denna sida (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/100271