CEO incentive provision in cooperatives : the impact of membership size and heterogeneity

Sammanfattning

A multi-task principal-agent model is formulated to capture the effect of membership size and heterogeneity on the incentive provision of the CEO in a cooperative. An increase in membership size as well as an increase in member heterogeneity decreases the optimal incentive intensity of the CEO.

Nyckelord

Cooperatives; Governance; Performance measurement

Publicerad i

Titel: Network governance. Alliances, Cooperatives and Franchise chains
Utgivare: Springer

SLU författare

• Feng, Li

  • Institutionen för ekonomi, Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet
    

UKÄ forskningsämne

Nationalekonomi

Publikationens identifierare

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2867-2_10
• ISBN: 978-3-7908-2866-5
• eISBN: 978-3-7908-2867-2

Permanent länk till denna sida (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/42303