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Abstract

Self-protection has private goods characteristics as it reduces own exposure to pollution given a certain level of pollution. We study the effect of timing self-protection before, after or simultaneously with abatement. We find that self-protection when timed before abatements has strategic effects. In this case self-protection, shifts the second stage subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of abatements such that own contributions of abatement are decreased and those of the other country are increased. Thereby shifting future abatement costs to the other country. When countries cooperate only on abatement, the incentives to shift future abatement costs are greater. Contrary to, intention, cooperation on abatement may in fact worsen environmental quality if it does not include self-protection.

Keywords

Self-protection; Abatement; Mitigation; Adaptation; Cost-efficiency; Strategic behaviors

Published in

Environmental and Resource Economics
2009, volume: 44, number: 3, pages: 337-350
Publisher: SPRINGER

SLU Authors

Global goals (SDG)

SDG13 Climate action

UKÄ Subject classification

Economics and Business
Social Sciences

Publication identifier

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-009-9289-1

Permanent link to this page (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/61658