Zehaie, Ficre
- Institutionen för ekonomi, Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet
Sammanfattning
Self-protection has private goods characteristics as it reduces own exposure to pollution given a certain level of pollution. We study the effect of timing self-protection before, after or simultaneously with abatement. We find that self-protection when timed before abatements has strategic effects. In this case self-protection, shifts the second stage subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of abatements such that own contributions of abatement are decreased and those of the other country are increased. Thereby shifting future abatement costs to the other country. When countries cooperate only on abatement, the incentives to shift future abatement costs are greater. Contrary to, intention, cooperation on abatement may in fact worsen environmental quality if it does not include self-protection.
Nyckelord
Self-protection; Abatement; Mitigation; Adaptation; Cost-efficiency; Strategic behaviors
Publicerad i
Environmental and Resource Economics
2009, volym: 44, nummer: 3, sidor: 337-350
Utgivare: SPRINGER
SLU författare
Globala målen (SDG)
SDG13 Bekämpa klimatförändringarna
UKÄ forskningsämne
Ekonomi och näringsliv
Samhällsvetenskap
Publikationens identifierare
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-009-9289-1
Permanent länk till denna sida (URI)
https://res.slu.se/id/publ/61658