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Sammanfattning

This paper examines the net benefit accruing to a present-biased government contemplating the option of speeding up investment setting a lower tax rate on future profits or an investment subsidy as an incentive. The literature generally suggests the use of an investment subsidy rather than a reduced tax rate. However, this study shows that, depending on the degree of present-biasedness, it may be more advantageous for the government to set a lower tax rate. The government, in fact, when selecting the instrument to be used for speeding up investment, trades off the immediate and certain cost of a subsidy against the random tax revenues accruing from the investment. Hence, from the short-sighted perspective of current government, a lower tax rate may appear optimal as long as the consideration given to the earnings of future governments is small and/or the current government's duration is short.

Nyckelord

Investment; Real options; Quasi-hyperbolic discounting; Tax reduction; Investment subsidy

Publicerad i

Journal of Economics
2016, volym: 119, nummer: 2, sidor: 101-111
Utgivare: SPRINGER WIEN

SLU författare

UKÄ forskningsämne

Nationalekonomi

Publikationens identifierare

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-016-0494-4

Permanent länk till denna sida (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/78021