Dynamic repeated random dictatorship and gender discrimination

Sammanfattning

To reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect we embed a dictator game in a more complex decision environment, a dynamic household savings decision problem, thus rendering the dictator decision to share some endowment less salient. We then use this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender specific allocation behaviour and discrimination. We observe that dictators treat females nicer than males independent of their own gender. Participants are not aware of their discriminating behaviour. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Nyckelord

Repeated dictator game; Altruistic preferences; Gender discrimination; Non-deceptive obfuscation

Publicerad i

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
2015, volym: 55, sidor: 81-90
Utgivare: ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC

SLU författare

• Kulesz, Micaela

  • Leibniz center for Tropical Marine Ecology (Zmt)

UKÄ forskningsämne

Nationalekonomi

Publikationens identifierare

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2015.02.001

Permanent länk till denna sida (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/79818