CEO incentive provision in cooperatives

Feng, Li; Hendrikse, George

doi:10.1007/978-3-7908-2867-2_10

Book chapter2013Peer reviewed

CEO incentive provision in cooperatives : the impact of membership size and heterogeneity

Feng, Li; Hendrikse, George

Abstract

A multi-task principal-agent model is formulated to capture the effect of membership size and heterogeneity on the incentive provision of the CEO in a cooperative. An increase in membership size as well as an increase in member heterogeneity decreases the optimal incentive intensity of the CEO.

Keywords

Cooperatives; Governance; Performance measurement

Published in

Title: Network governance. Alliances, Cooperatives and Franchise chains
Publisher: Springer

SLU Authors

Feng, Li
- Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences

UKÄ Subject classification

Economics

Publication identifier

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2867-2_10
ISBN: 978-3-7908-2866-5
eISBN: 978-3-7908-2867-2

Permanent link to this page (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/42303