Abstract

In recent years, it has become common for downstream firms to impose Joint Private Standards (JPSs) on upstream producers. In this paper, we present an original model of a vertical relationship, explaining the incentives for and the effects of such JPSs with an example concerning food safety. The risk of a food crisis is endogenously determined. Using the concept of cartel stability (), it is shown that liability rules are crucial for JPSs to emerge, that a JPS can become a minimum quality standard, and that a more stringent JPS does not necessarily reduce the market risk.

Keywords

Private Standards; Safety; Vertical Relationships; Liability; Food Retailing

Published in

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
2012, Volume: 21, number: 1, pages: 179-212
Publisher: WILEY-BLACKWELL

SLU Authors

• Hoffmann, Ruben

  • Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
    

Sustainable Development Goals

End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture


UKÄ Subject classification

Social Sciences
Food Science
Economics and Business


Publication identifier

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00320.x

Permanent link to this page (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/56378