Sammanfattning

This paper discusses Pareto efficient allocations of an environmental commodity, which is both a public good and a public bad, with an application to the Scandinavian problem of conserving wild predators that are killing semi-domesticated reindeer. The paper begins by briefly outlining this conflict. This is followed by a theoretical analysis employing a diagrammatic tool called the Kolm triangle, which is an analogue of an Edgeworth box in an economy with a public good. Bargaining, Pareto improving reallocations and the shape of the Pareto set are discussed, using a simple model, where one of the agents is involountarily contributing to a public good. The paper concludes with an analysis of income-loss compensations and incentives for illegal hunting of predators.

Nyckelord

bargaining; compensations; illegal hunting; Kolm triangle; public goods' reindeer; wild predators

Publicerad i

Environmental and Resource Economics
1999, Volym: 13, nummer: 1, sidor: 59-73
Utgivare: SPRINGER

SLU författare

• Bostedt, Göran

  • Institutionen för skogsekonomi, Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet
    

UKÄ forskningsämne

Nationalekonomi


Publikationens identifierare

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008201401068

Permanent länk till denna sida (URI)

https://res.slu.se/id/publ/63129